A couple of weeks ago I posted a poll on this channel with a very general question, hoping to get a particular answer.
What I wanted to do with that Poll was to confirm the reputation of the P-51 Mustang and see if an article I read recently really holds weight.
Just how significant was the role of the P-51 in the ETO, and did its arrival really revolutionize the air battle against the Luftwaffe?
I also wanted to see if I could find evidence for these claims myself, or statistics that disproved the theory that the Mustang was simply the dog’s bollocks and nothing could touch it.
Was the P-51 the best fighter WW2 in the European Theater?
So this is going to be my approach.
Now first things first, I’m not going to spend any time at all exploring whether the P-51 Mustang was a better fighter than either the Fw 190 or ME 109. You already know it was a fine fighter and more than a match for German aircraft when used to its strengths.
I’m also not going to waste time discussing if the Mustang was the best Allied fighter. I have my doubts, but that is a topic for another video.
I’m also not going to dwell too much on what would have happened without any P-51s at all, or even just ones with shorter range. Suffice it to say, the war might have been bloodier and longer but its conclusion was not in doubt.
What I do want to talk about, and what I spent quite a few hours researching, is whether I could find statistical evidence of the claims made about the P-51. That’s to say, the Mustang killed off the Luftwaffe almost single-handedly and won the war.
I also wanted to know if the claims that the P-51 was the only fighter capable of long-range escort missions over Germany were true? Basically, is this classic image correct in any way?
How good was the P-51 as a fighter?
So, let’s find out if the P-51 really is all it’s made out to be…
So my first question and something I wanted to know more about was this, did the Mustang inflict significantly more damage on the enemy than other Allied fighters? If so, did it play a major role in defeating the Luftwaffe and ending its capability to wage war?
There are four main ways any air force can be effectively put out of action. You can knock out or capture its airbases. You can destroy its fleet and stop its resupply of aircraft. You can cut off its supply of fuel and oil. Or You can simply kill its pilots.
Clearly, the P-51 could only participate directly in one or two of these approaches.
The only way that I could prove or disprove this was to look at Luftwaffe casualty records. However, unlike with the RAF where I have access to lots of published records and lots of friendly and helpful people who will share databases with me, all the Luftwaffe records seem safely locked away in the Bundesarchiv.
A JG 26 Case study
So, getting a wide overview of the daily losses of Luftwaffe fighter units wasn’t possible with the time I had. Luckily, we were saved by the tremendous work of Don Caldwell.
Donald is one of the leading experts on JG 26, and I was able to use his research to extract the data we needed to TRY and answer this question.
Now, I just have to make it clear at this point that I don’t consider what I’m doing here as groundbreaking in any way. I just wanted to confirm with my own eyes what has been stated again and again in countless books, videos and forums. Would I come up with the same results?
So, JG 26 is a good unit to study. For the most part, they spent the entire war in the West. True, some isolated squadrons in the Group did spend time on the Eastern Front and in the Mediterranean theater, but not for that long. This means that JG 26 is a good representation of what the Luftwaffe experienced at the hands of the Anglo-American air forces in the West.
Caldwell’s data shows us that between 1939 and 1945, 1,319 pilots serving with JG 26 are recorded as casualties. It also tells us the cause of that casualty, be it accident, fighter or flak.
After punching in the data, WHICH Allied fighter led to the most casualties amongst JG 26 pilots?
You guess it, the Spitfire.
352 men were either killed or wounded at the hands of Spitfires, which is almost twice that of the top American fighter in the list. However, this is to be expected. The Spitfire was in combat with JG 26 for much of the war and also as expected, its tally against the unit slows as the air war changed in 1942/43. But let’s not forget, JG 26’s men are still falling to Spits right into May 1945. In fact, Spitfire shot down more pilots from this unit than any other fighter in the last two months of the war. So, my point is, a little nod to the Spit.
At this point, I should mention that 89 JG 26 pilots are listed as casualties from unknown sources or unidentified Allied fighters. It’s entirely possible all of these are at the hands of a P-51, or none. As with anything I do or say, take the figures with a healthy dash of salt.
So in terms of the impact of American fighters on JG 26 alone, we can see that:
| Aircraft | Tally vs JG 26 |
| Spitfire | 352 |
| P-38 | 15 |
| P-47 | 118 |
| P-51 | 111 |
So this would suggest that the P-47 on paper was deadlier. Nevertheless, if we consider these aircraft in the same light as the Spitfire, we need to remember each fighter was in action for different lengths of time.
| Aircraft | Months of operations |
| Spitfire | 60 |
| P-38 | ~6 |
| P-47 | 25 |
| P-51 | 17 |
Spitfires operated against JG26 for the best part of 60 months, the P-47 for 25 months, and the American-operated P-51 for 17 months. Of course, the British had been flying their Mustangs since at least August 1942.
So, in that time what was each fighter’s tally against this single Gruppen?
| Aircraft | JG 26 aircraft destroyed/month |
| Spitfire | 5.6* |
| Aircraft | JG 26 aircraft destroyed/month |
| Spitfire | 7.4 |
| P-38 | 2.5 |
| P-47 | 7.24 |
| P-51 | 6.53 |
Spitfires managed an average of 5.9 JG26 pilots per month either Killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.
If we break that down to just 1943 to 1945, we get 7.4 over those 28 months, which is 206 pilots in total.
The P-47’s ratio against JG 26 stands at 7.24 and the P-51 at 6.53.
How many Allied Fighters were operating against JG 26?
It’s hard to give a good estimation of how many Spitfires were flying against JG26 throughout the war, In November 1944 there were at least 1,003. That being said, we can get a good idea of the size of the 8th Fighter command. (1003 total Spits – 477 Fighter command – 526 2nd tactical in November 1944)
At its height, 15 Fighter groups were operating over Europe as part of the 8th air force. By August 1944, each group was also operating between 85-90 aircraft, though they would not of all been serviceable.
| Month/Year | No. P-47 Groups | No. P-38 Groups | No. P-51 Groups |
|---|---|---|---|
| April 1943 | 3 | / | / |
| October 1943 | 7 | 1 | |
| December 1943 | 7 | 3 | 1 |
| December 1944 | 1 | 0 | 14 |
If we look at the size of the organization from 1943, we see that 3 P-47 groups were available from April of that year growing to 7 groups by October. One additional P-38 group was assigned to the 8th fighter command the same month, the first since 1942. In December another P-38 group arrived as did the first group equipped with P-51Bs. By the end of 1943 according to my sources, there were a total of 7 P-47 groups, 2 P-38 groups, and a single P-51 group.
A year later, the 8th air force had grown by another 5 fighter groups, and every single one of them, except the 56th Group, was operating a P-51.
What’s interesting to me is that despite there being an average of say 909 P-51s operating to just 48 P-47s, the Mustang doesn’t make a bigger impact on JG 26 in 1945. Why do you think this is? Is it because German pilots from this particular unit met fewer Mustangs or does it reflect a wider trend across the entire Luftwaffe?
Why did the P-51 seem to have done so well against the Luftwaffe?
In a mini-conclusion of this section of the video, I think we need to remember the context in which American fighter escorts operated. When the P-47 was the principal escort fighter earlier in the 8th air force’s campaign, it didn’t roam as far as the bombers in Germany.
As we’ll discuss a little later, this wasn’t because they couldn’t, it’s because they weren’t given the opportunity to do so. Not only was the objective of the P-47 prohibitive to gaining aerial victories, but it also fell to the first fighter groups in Europe to devise the best escort tactics. Developing the doctrine usually results in less success early on.
I should also NOT forget to mention here that the P-51B was plagued with its OWN issues in 1943, particularly its guns jamming and spark plugs fouling up, and it wasn’t until the D model arrived that most of the bugs were ironed out. This meant that BOTH fighters weren’t always able to tangle with German fighters as much in 1943 as in 1944.
For the P-47s, A switch from an umbrella to a more level escort approach, as well as a fighter sweep system, made engagement easier and more common. Earlier tactics often left the escorting Thunderbolts in the wrong place at the wrong time. For this we might blame the Brits they learned the tactic from.
Of course, there is also the Luftwaffe to consider, who couldn’t help but notice the P-47’s Point of No return.
The way P-47s were operated in 1943 simply led to fewer potential engagements with the Luftwaffe, who quite rightly waited to engage unescorted bombers when the fighters returned home.
When the P-47 was operated to its full potential and given the resources to do so, it both increased its hunting range and its victory tally. You can clearly see in the data for JG26, WHERE February and March 1944 saw a three-fold increase in the AVERAGE P-47 victories over the unit in the previous 4 months.
This period also highlights a change BOTH in escort doctrine and management within the 8th Fighter command. No longer were the fighters glued to the bombers, and the OBJECTIVE had changed from interception of the Luftwaffe…. to its total destruction.
In our small example, it appears that the P-47 would have shot down more JG26 aircraft in the same 17 months the P-51s were operating, and in reality, the single P-47 group IN 1945 scored more kills against this unit than the other 14 P-51 groups put together. However, I think we have to take this with a pinch of salt, and only by evaluating the entire Luftwaffe, or at least another group, could we come up with any clear conclusions. It’s STILL interesting to see this trend nonetheless.
So, was the P-51 relatively more successful in a shorter career because it was a better aircraft or because it was given more opportunities over a Luftwaffe that could no longer hide from it? Or was it both?
I think another factor that perhaps doesn’t get much attention, and which didn’t show up on my radar MUCH before researching this video, if you pardon the pun, was fighter vectoring.
As you know fighter vectoring was instrumental for the British during the Battle just as much as it was for German night fighters hunting nocturnal Luftgangsters. American fighters also benefited from being vectored onto targets as the war progressed.
As early as 1943, what was known as the “Y” service, was intercepting radio traffic from German fighters as they prepared to defend their homeland. These signals could be triangulated and then used to vector fighter sweeps toward the area.
After the successful invasion of mainland Europe, Microwave Early Warning control had been moved from the English coastline to the Netherlands. So From November 1944, the fighters had gained an additional 165 miles OF early warning into enemy territory.
Combining this system with information from “Y” service, gave 8th Fighter command a very good picture of enemy air activity and where they could seek out the Luftwaffe and destroy it. And All this was happening very much as the P-51 was being supplied to the 8th air force in increasing numbers. I think we can only conclude that fighter sweeps became much more effective and resulted in more victories over the Luftwaffe.
Was the P-51 the only long-range fighter available to the allies?
This brings me to the next point which has always troubled me. Was the P-51 really the only fighter the Allies had that could serve in the LONG escort role?
The simple answer is no.
Not only has the potential range of the P-47 been grossly underestimated by many mainstream histories of the war, the effective range of the P-51 may also have been overestimated, A BIT .
Now for those of you screaming at the screen, about Greg’s airplanes and Automobiles, yes I am going to give a huge nod to Greg’s excellent video about this. He does indeed go into excruciating detail about the subject but I’d encourage you to check out his video sometime, I’ll even include a link to it in the description. I’m actually going to follow Greg’s advice and take a look at the data myself.
Could the latest version of the P-47, with the best configuration of external fuel and internal fuel tanks, fly further than the latest version of the P-51, probably not. What is certain is that even the C or D model p-47, could easily get a fat ReichMarshal down to the local office and change his name by deed poll. Its design may also have given it a MORE comparable combat range to the P-51 in certain circumstances THAN OFTEN THOUGHT.
I want to explore this with an imaginary escort mission from Duxford, the home of the 78th fighter group to Berlin.
Internal fule capacity of the P-51 and P-47
Each fighter is part of a relay system, so they can fly directly to and from their rendezvous with the bomber stream. This also allows them to fly at their maximum range of power settings to get maximum fuel efficiency. However, we’re going to get them to fly at 25,000 feet to minimize the chance of them being jumped by any German fighters, who might be brave enough to engage them en-route.
How far would each of them get?
First let’s consider the internal fuel capacity of the P-47 and the P-51. At this point, I’m going to forget the P-38. It didn’t seem to make much of an impact on JG26, so perhaps it’s better just to focus on the P-47 as the only candidate in the ETO to replace a non-existent long-range P-51.
P-51 internal fuel specs
The P-51 ACTUALLY had 245.4 gallons of usable fuel in its internal tanks. NOT quite the 269 gallons often quoted.
Main LH -90.4 US gallons
Main RH- 90 US gallons
Fuselage – 65 US gallons
P-47 internal fuel specs
The P-47 on the other hand had 305 gallons of usable fuel in its internal tanks
Main tank – 205 US gallons
Auxiliary tank – 100 US gallons
Although the P-47 carries just shy of 60 gallons more than the P-51, its 18-cylinder supercharged Pratt & Whitney R-2800-21 engine, is a thirsty beast. Just getting off the ground is going to use up nearly 45 gallons of fuel.
As we send our fighters off from Duxford bound for the German capital, they are going to be operating at much higher power settings, and so for a straight climb to 25,000 feet over the North sea, the P-47 will use up approximately 149.6 gallons of fuel, including those 45 gallons or so to taxi and get airborne. Getting to that altitude is only going to take about 20 minutes but will get the P-47 123.8 miles closer to Berlin.
At the same time, the P-51 reached the same altitude in just 18 minutes using only 58.5 gallons of fuel, but it has only traveled 93 miles. I should also mention that in this example I’m not giving any additional time or fuel for formation assembly. I’m apparently sending out a single P-51 and P-47 to face the might of the Luftwaffe alone.
At this point, the pilot of each respective fighter can settle down and set up the aircraft to achieve the best range at the appointed altitude. You can clearly tell that I’m a pilot trained in peacetime as I’m not thinking about combat conditions, more on this a little later.
From here on out, assuming all goes well, the P-47 will gain 3 miles for every gallon consumed while the P-51 will travel 11.3 miles. This is slightly less on the return leg as we’re facing a headwind and the ground speed will drop.
So, just from those figures alone, you wouldn’t be wrong to guess that the P-51 will travel considerably further than the P-47. But if you are thinking that, then you probably didn’t read the Pilot’s operating manual, and you didn’t see an important operating procedure mentioned on page 67.
Before we get into that, I should quickly explain how I came up with these numbers and I’m going to do that without boring you too much.
As I mentioned before, Greg in his fantastic series about P-47s, brought up this issue of range and how the P-47 had been misrepresented by the Bomber Mafia. He also mentioned that he had worked on the numbers himself and generally agreed with documents that were more generous to the Thunderbolt than the classic chart on screen now.
So, I wanted to confirm this myself and as an ex-PPL pilot, I had the vaguest memory of how to do it. I’ve simply merged the flight data available in pilot manuals for the P-51 and P-47 with a Fuel consumption flight calculator that I adapted for the task.
Within these calculations, I’ve included a few key figures which are just as important now as they were then.
Firstly, as previously referred to, you need to consider the fuel consumption while taxing on the ground as well as during take-off where more power is needed. I’ve also considered the fuel consumed and distance covered while reaching my assigned mission altitude of 25,000 feet. This is all under normal flight conditions and not at military power.
Why not 30 or 35 thousand? Well, the simple answer is that 25,000 feet gave me numbers for both aircraft that could make an apples-to-apples comparison possible in a more operational context.
We also have to consider a reserve of fuel for diverting to an alternative airfield due to bad weather or some fool of a Met Officer incorrectly calculating the wind (see my video on the Eagle squadron for a good story about this). I gave each fighter 30 minutes as a reserve.
I’ve also remembered to allow fuel for the fighter’s main role, TO engage the enemy. Each aircraft gets 15 minutes at Combat power settings, including the maximum War Emergency Power limited to just 5 minutes total during any one flight.
Another very important factor to consider is that our P-51 and P-47 aren’t flying on paper. As hinted at, flying in the real world presents a problem, and that problem is wind.
So, I punched in all the numbers to a popular flight planning website to get some ground speeds to work with, one flying to Berlin and a much slower one flying home.
This enabled me to get a rough fuel burn per mile, and that can tell us the exact point at which the P-47 and P-51 would have to turn for home if they still wanted to land in one piece.
With the setting and meteorological conditions in this example, a P-47 flying on only its internal fuel tanks would need to turn for a home somewhere above Amsterdam which is roughly 206 miles from Duxford and 350 miles or so short of the target, Berlin.
Based on the figures alone, the P-51 would go a lot further, reaching The German-Polish border which is around 631 miles from Duxford and, well, past the capital.
So it’s pointless to argue that the P-51 had a greater range than the P-47. However, I would say that these calculations are based on a climb out and straight run home with 15 minutes of combat allowance. That being said, there is no reserve and no escort calculation here. With these criteria added, the P-51 would make it well into Germany, but the P-47 would almost have to turn for home once it had reached its mission altitude.
Still, we can’t forget what’s written on page 67 of the P-51 pilot’s manual.
Helping the P-51 to increase its range
In addition to the external fuel tanks that P-51s were fitted within 1943 and 1944, thanks to the FAREP initiative (Fighter Airplane Range Extension Program), started by Brig Gen Fairchild, one other man made sure that the Mustang got a little extra juice, almost 85 gallons in fact.
That man was Mark E Bradley, the Air Chief of Aircraft projects at Wright field in 1943. After witnessing the effects of the heavy losses experienced by the 8th air force as well as the worrying P-75 project, he was a man on a mission and wanted to see P-51s flying further as well as with the British teardrop canopies. It was due to his scathing report of the P-75’s capabilities that General Orval Cook allowed Bradley to pursue his new idea of putting an additional fuel tank in the P-51.
When approached to carry out the modifications, James H. “Dutch” Kindelberger expressed his concerns over putting an experimental 75-gallon tank right behind the pilot. Not only would it throw off the center of gravity, it would also make a fully loaded P-51 almost unflyable. Bradley, acknowledge this fact but asked him to do it anyway, and this brings us back to page 67.
The problem with having this extra fuel tank was that until its fuel was burned off, the Mustang would be a sitting duck. Ordinarily, when airborne a fighter pilot would want to consume the fuel in his external fuel tanks first. This is especially true when these tanks fed the engine directly, as was the case with the P-51.
However, to make the P-51 easier to fly and combat capable, the pilot was instructed to use the fuselage tank as soon as possible after gaining cruising altitude. He also had to use the LH wing tank on the ground and for take-off because the vapor separation line from the carburetor(pron) fed only into that tank.
What is said on page 67 is that the pilot should quickly use up the fuselage tank’s fuel, leaving 25 gallons for better handling when landing.
While this doesn’t strictly affect a flight on internal fuel alone, it does have a big impact on flying with drop tanks, something I’m going to talk about next.
Now if you’re wondering, didn’t he say a 75-gallon tank before? Well, yes I did. Production models were actually fitted with an 85-gallon tank but 65 gallons was considered the maximum limit for these types of tanks before they caused too much instability. In some circumstances, there was even a prohibition against using these tanks at all.
So when you see the fuel capacity of the P-51 stated as 269 gallons think 249 gallons, then think 245.4 usable gallons instead.
Escorting Bombers over Germany
Another key thing to remember is the actual purpose of this mission, to escort bombers over enemy territory.
For the escort relay system, fighters would fly their shift of about 150 to 200 miles of the route. Let’s imagine that a group of B-17s is flying for the best range at 150 IAS, which might give them a ground speed on this mission of around 441. So that would take around 27 minutes to complete 200 miles of the track. Let’s just call that 30 minutes. The fighters have a ground speed of some 100 mph faster than the B-17. So either they would have to reduce speed to stay with the bombers, which would be undesirable for fuel consumption and combat effectiveness, or they fly circuits.
So, we might need to factor in up to 30 minutes of flying at less efficient settings and burning up more fuel for distance traveled or just reduce that 30 minutes of level flight down to a maximum of 200 miles traveled.
In terms of maximum fuel capacity with drop tanks, both fighters could actually make it to Berlin and back. (show fuel needed)
You can see here the total fuel onboard, the fuel needed to climb to 25,000, to cruise to a point 200 miles from Berlin, into the target as escorts, and then flying home, with the fuel left even at 25000 ft over Duxford, so plenty of fuel to descend and land even from over the north sea
But what would happen to each fighter if it was jumped by German fighters on its way to Berlin and had to jettison its drop tanks? How far could a P-51 or P-47 penetrate into Germany before being forced to return home on its internal fuel reserves?
Given the tailwind and headwind on the return for this particular mission, the Point of No return for the P-47 would be around Brandenburg, 40 miles short of Berlin. The P-51 would make it to Poznan, well into Poland
How did I get these numbers? Again we need to subtract the fuel needed for taxing, take off, and the climb to 25,000 feet.
For the P-47, I’m assuming that at 5,000 ft into its climb, the pilot had switched over to external fuel, thus only burning up 45 gallons of his 305 gallons internal capacity. For the P-51 pilot, he not only needs to use the LH main tank on the ground, but it also seems likely that internal fuel is used for most of the ascent and certainly until only 25 gallons remain in the fuselage tank.
For this I did factor in a combat allowance of 15 minutes, they are being bounced, but I’m assuming the escort leg would be over and the pilot would eat into his 30-minute reserve.
And as mentioned before, the P-51 would have already used at least 40 gallons from its fuselage tank in order to make it combat-ready.
So, If the fighter dropped their tanks anywhere before this point, getting home would be almost guaranteed depending on battle damage. Anywhere after this point, even the reserve fuel might not be enough for them to land in England.
So why are my calculations so different to the classic map circulated far and wide across the internet?
Well, during the war, the P-51 and P-47’s range would have been evaluated with a fairly standard test, and here’s how it was calculated.
How was tactical radius calculated:
Fuel Consumption and Tactical Radius of Action. These tests were run by individual ships and in three ships string, and the tactical radius of action is computed conservatively from the highest figures.
source
Using a standard formula of climb – 25,000 ft. at maximum permissible power, 5 minutes combat at full military power, 5 minutes combat at normal rated power (100%) and 10 minutes at 75% power, 5 minutes return at 75% power and the balance of the journey at 67% power
However when you look at the information printed in the pilot manual, it gives you a slightly different story and one certainly not told in a combat situation. So, as air supremacy increased, it would certainly have been possible for more economic settings to be used without putting the fighter in a vulnerable situation, especially in the case of the P-47 which had worse acceleration than the Mustang.
Did the P-51 Really defeat the Luftwaffe on its own?
Another question that always springs to mind when I see a comment about how the P-51 was the best thing sliced bread and how it defeated the Luftwaffe in less than 18 months, is this one.
Did the Mustang shoot down more aircraft in the air or destroy more on the ground?
According to the research of Dr. Frank Olynyk, the 8th Fighter command inflicted 9283.3 victories over the Luftwaffe. That figure doesn’t include gunner victories from bomber command.
Of these, approximately 55.7% (5170) were aerial victories whiles the rest were aircraft destroyed on the ground (4113.3). The P-51 accounted for 6540.8 aircraft according to this research, just over half being aerial victories. The P-47 and P-38, though scoring drastically fewer victories overall, combined achieved almost as many aerial victories as the Mustang. (show table on screen)
Here we have to remember that the P-47 and especially the P-38 operated in smaller numbers and were more constricted by fighter doctrine than the more numerous P-51 by the end of the war.
So in terms of destroying aircraft, the P-51 was certainly instrumental in the 9283.3 losses suffered by the Luftwaffe. However, right up until the closing months of 1944, German aircraft production was increasing rather than decreasing. This was mainly due to factors that pre-dated the war.
This meant that in fact, the Luftwaffe had just as many aircraft to put in the field by the time the P-51 arrived in Europe as it did before its arrival. This begs the question, how good was the P-51 at killing German pilots?
If we turn back to our mini JG 26 case study, we can see that in total 1,319 casualties were suffered. Of those, 54%, some 707, are noted as Killed in action, Prisoners of war, or Missing in action. The remaining 612 men are listed as Killed or wounded in flying accidents, Killed or wounded in accidents, or Unknown. 313 of these are also noted down as Wounded in action but it’s not recorded if this meant they returned to combat or not.
So, of those 707 men clearly taken out of the fight, the P-51 accounted for 80 pilots, the P-47 for 110, the P-38 just 9, and the Spitfire 245. The remaining 263 men were taken out of the war by other aircraft or combat causes. Even if you add the Wounded in Action victims, the story doesn’t change much.
It would be interesting to be able to extend this study across all Luftwaffe units and see if the same results can be found.
As the major role of an escort fighter is to protect bombers, What was the impact of the P51 on bomber losses?
It could be argued that from January 1944, this really wasn’t a relevant question anymore. Doolittle had applied his 15th air force approach to the 8th fighter command, and the Objective was no longer restricted to bomber survival, by rather the destruction of the Luftwaffe.
This is also something that I just haven’t had the scope to look at in more detail myself. I don’t have the right sources to hand, whether primary or secondary, and it’s a project I’ll have to leave for the future. However, the closest primary source I can find on the topic says this:
In 1943, when the Eighth Air Force’s force of bombers was small and escort short range, the enemy could inflict losses of around 7.5 percent of the number of our aircraft actually bombing targets. In the 6 months ending with April 1944, he could inflict average losses per mission of around 4 percent of the force bombing. This drop was caused by advent of long range escort, actual growth of our bomber force, and great relative growth compared to enemy fighter opposition. It was accomplished in spite of the fact that the number of days of operation had been stepped up from about 8 per month to over 20 per month in March and April, 1944. For the rest of 1944 and 1945, losses averaged only 2 percent per mission of the force bombing. Such a percentage loss indicates harassing attacks by the enemy rather than effective opposition.
8th Air Force Tactical development 1942-45 (Page 92)
So this suggests that the change in tactics and growth of the American fighter force really did have a positive impact on bomber survival. However, while the percentage of losses for each mission may certainly have dropped, the actual number of bombers failing to return continued to grow until the end of the war. The more planes being sent out, the more were going to be lost in combat. Instantly I want to know are those bomber losses from flak, weather or fighters?
So again, I’d love to get the right data to have a better look at this. (cough) American Air Museum, if you’re watching please reply to the email I sent you about this. Cheers!
The same source also makes this claim:
(April 1944) But the war in the air was already won. The enemy had lost two irreplaceable commodities. His supply of experienced fighter pilots was depleted. And some months of reduced aircraft production during a crucial period could never be replaced”! Now if he built aircraft he would have only inferior pilots to fly them.
8th Air Force Tactical development 1942-45 (page 77)
Were Luftwaffe pilots really killed off?
I’ve always wanted to know, did the Luftwaffe actually lose the bulk of its experience fighter pilots?
Ultimately there was never a complete lack of aircraft or pilots. What eventually grounded the Luftwaffe was a lack of fuel and suitable airfields. I have a theory that among the surviving aircrew, there were many more experienced men than thought and not just new recruits. However, again I’ve not found the right data to research this, yet.
Ultimately there’s a lot that I couldn’t look at in this project, either because I didn’t have the data or the time, and also largely because I don’t know about it yet.
What I think the data from JG 26 shows is that the P-51 was indeed a vital aircraft for the allies, but it in no way won the air war against THIS unit by itself. Its destruction of the Luftwaffe seems more cumulative to the impact of its contemporaries rather than simply outshining them. It was a good aircraft, but I still feel that most of us don’t view its contribution within the right context.
I may have only scratched the surface of this topic, but I can clearly see that the arrival of the P-51 in 1943 and onwards was also good timing. Tactics had improved, technology could help more and the enemy was certainly less elusive than he had been before. I think we’ve also seen that had it needed to, the P-47 could have arrived over the furthest reaches of Germany in numbers. It may have been bloodier and most costly, but the results would likely have been the same in time.
