It’s the 22nd of April 1943, flying low over the Mediterranean sea, 14 Giants are on a vital mission, heading for Africa. Their assignment is to deliver much-needed fuel and supplies to the beleaguered Africa Korp around Tunis. The Messerschmitt Me 323s are expected, and not just by their German comrades.
Suddenly, the shout goes out, Enemy aircraft have been sighted. With no altitude to maneuver and carrying a maximum load of highly flammable fuel, they are sitting ducks.
It’s a massacre.
None of the Gigants survive the onslaught. Worse still, countless lives are lost as rescue missions to find the men in the water are delayed. What’s more, the flight of Junkers Ju 52s that departed with the behemoth Me323s, arrived at their destination without a scratch.
This is the story of the death of the German Giants at the hands of the Desert Air Force.
Why did the Germans need to transport supplies to North Africa?
By 1943 the infamous Africa Korp was on the back foot. Suffering a significant defeat at the end of 1942 in the Second Battle of El Alamein, the German position was further undermined by the Allied landings the same month in Morocco and Algeria, code-named Operation Torch.
Rommel was forced to conduct a fighting retreat back toward Tripoli and was subsequently ordered to personally withdraw from North Africa in March 1943. The remaining Africa Korp was being squeezed between two fronts and their supplies were running dangerously low. Top on their list was fuel and ammunition.
The allies were well aware of the German situation and attempted to cut their supply lines by land, sea and by air. Operation Flax, launched at the beginning of April 1943, was the air campaign that was aimed at closing the Sicilian Strait.
The 22nd of April 1943, Maundy Thursday, goes down as the worst in history for the Messerschmitt Me 323.
The six engine colossus was a motorized adaptation of the Me 321 glider variant. It had been developed to enable the Wehrmacht to transport heavy equipment over sea barriers, such as the English channel.
With a crew of 5, the Me 323s could transport up to 130 troops or up to 12,000 kg, 26,500 lb. First entering service in November 1942, their 1,100 km ferry range would be tested by the mediterranean sea.
In a renewed effort to deliver desperately needed supplies to German forces in North Africa, the Luftwaffe launched a large supply operation in late November from Italy, via Sicily, to Tunis.
Preparations for the operation
On the morning of the 22nd, an assortment of aircraft had been detailed for the mission that day, including Junkers Ju 52s and the huge Me 323
Ten Ju 52s from Kampfgruppe z.b.V. 106 took off from Pomigliano near Naples at 0640 hours. Their destination was Tunis, across the Mediterranean sea in Tunisia. This formation was led by Staffelkapitan Oblt. Biedermann. Joining the tri-motor Junkers was a group of fourteen Me 323s which also took off from Pomigliano 30 minutes later.
The transport planes would not face the long sea crossing alone. Steps were taken to provide them with the maximum available fighter escort. They would be joined over the coast of Sicily by their first group of escorts and then met by a second group flying out from Tunis herself.
As the mission was being prepared, confidence must have been pretty high. On 19 April, a successful mission had been completed where all the aircraft had returned safely. However, other flights had met the patrolling enemy too, and flight plans were drawn up accordingly.
And so, each of the Gigants would be loaded up with 12 metric tons of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies destined for the Afrika Korps. To put that in context, each ME 323 was carrying enough fuel to fill up your average Toyota Corolla 680 times. Another way to put it is that a single Me 323 was carrying enough fuel to fill the tanks of just over 3 squadrons of 109s.
However, in reality, each Giant aircraft was only bringing enough fuel to run 22 Panzer IV tanks, which for a very thirsty mechanized army, wouldn’t go very far.
By the time of this mission the Desert Fox was gone, and the hard-pressed force was led by Generaloberst von Arnim. He would later surrender to the Allies, and in no small way due to actions such as the one on the 22nd April 1943.
The plan had called for 16 Me 323s to be used for this operation. This was out of a force of some 38 aircraft assigned to KG.z.b.V 323, split between I. Gruppe and II. Gruppe. As was usually the case, not all of these aircraft were serviceable at that time. This is perhaps surprising since they only recently arrived in the theater.. Two more would be left on the ground as the other 14 Me 323s got airborne
One of the pair was prepared for the mission but was found to be non-operational despite the ground crew’s best efforts. The second had been loaded up and actually started its take-off run when disaster struck.
Despite a seemingly successful engine run-up, two engines from C8+BN failed during the takeoff roll of the Gigantic aircraft. The remaining four Gnome-Rhône 14Ns couldn’t provide enough thrust to achieve flying speed. The aircraft ended up in a field after rolling off the end of the runway. Reportedly, it was later recovered.
Lumbering into the air, the force turned roughly South-West into the gulf of Naples and then out into the Tyrrhenian sea. Bound for the Sicilian coast.
Escort fighters and mistakes in the air
To meet them over the Axis-held island was a force of 39 Bf 109s from II./JG27. Taking off nearly an hour later than their charges, the 109s slowly assembled over Trapani, on the Western tip of Sicily at 8:30.
Anticipating Allied interceptors, a further force of 65 fighters from JG53 and JG77, based in Tunis, had been ordered to rendezvous with the transports and JG 27 fighters. If everything went as planned, this would be an impressive force that could almost guarantee the successful completion of the mission.
Joining up with the fighter escort, the transports turned west slightly, in order to arrive over the North African coast far from marauding Allied fighters. This brought them over the small island of Marettimo, just off the Western coast of Sicily. Reaching the open sea, the transports then dropped to almost wavetop height, skimming the Mediterranean as low as 20 ft according to one source.
The crews had been briefed to make landfall to the West of Tunis over Cap Farina. At all costs they should not cross Cap Bon. This headland lay 75 kilometers further East, the other side of Tunis.
Operation Flax was in full swing, and supplies were being lost to enemy action on a regular basis. This area was known to be heavily patrolled by Allied fighters and would put the heavily loaded transports in extreme danger should they overfly the headland.
Well on their way to their destination, the Me 323s which were flying further east to the Ju 52s made a fatal error.
About halfway between Sicily and the African Coast, Oberstleutnant Werner Stephan, who was leading the 14 ME 323s, turned his formation further south. Contrary to orders, this heading would now take the Giant transport aircraft straight over Cap Bon.
What’s more, as the distance between the Ju 52s and the Me 323s grew, the bulk of the 36 escorting BF 109s stuck with the former. However, as soon as the lumbering Ju-52s had been sighted by aircraft from JG53 and JG77, JG 27 was free to chase after Stephan and his Giants.
Be that as it may, as the Me 323s approached the precarious cap bon, they only had 7 to 9 fighters from the available 104 detailed to escort them.
The ME 323 massacre begins
Some 40 miles from Tunis, Stephan and his Me 323s ran out of luck. At Approximately 0925 the force of 14 Giants and less than a dozen BF 109s were jumped by 4 squadrons from the SAAF and RAF.
The action took place over the island of Zembra, which is just west of Cap bon. In fact, as the disaster unfolded, Oblt. Biedermann was leading his Ju 52s safely across the Cap Farina. They could actually see the attack on their wayward colleagues as it was executed.
Firstly, Spitfires from the 1st Squadron SAAF and 145th Squadron RAF engaged the meager low flying escort force. Driving them away from their charges, the Me 323s were opened up to the full fury of the second and larger attacking force.
P-40 Kittyhawks from No. 4 and 5 Squadrons SAAF tore into the fuel and ammunition laden Me 323s. A third squadron of Kittyhawks, No 2 SAAF, joined the Spitfires in their fight against the 109s.
Meanwhile the JU 52s led by Biedermann had patiently been circling a fighter base at Andeless, while he waited for the landing clearance he needed from Tunis.
The arrival of the Allied fighters was no coincidence. Although the Allies had been actively hunting supply aircraft since the start of Operation Flax, there was another more sinister reason for their presence.
It was well-known by the Allies that any transport aircraft flying in from the Italian mainland would naturally make for Tunis. Airfields further along the Tunisian coast were sparse or already captured by the Allies. Nevertheless, they could have easily missed such a prized target, had they not received a tip-off.
That very day, according to sources, the Germans uncovered a radio transmitter, which had been used to send information to the Allies on all German flight movements from Trapani. When a large formation of 109s had been sent up, it was a good indication that another supply mission was on its way.
Interestingly the radio was hidden in a confessional in a church on the hills above Trapani. What its operator was to release upon the force of Me 323, was nothing short of old testament fire and fury.
As soon as the news had been sent, an attacking force of allied fighters was prepared and the ambush was set.
As the P-40s closed in on the force of Me 323s, which was later reported as 20 aircraft not 14, all hell broke loose. Still flying at low altitude and in a tight formation, the Me 323s scattered as the fighters fired into their ranks.
Attempting to evade enemy fire and return it with their own wing-mounted gun positions, disaster struck one time after another. The Me 323 being largely made of wood could usually take a huge amount of punishment. That day, however, they were packed full of fuel and ammo, which just lit up when the P-40s ripped into them.
Many of the Me 323s were set ablaze and fell into the sea, others simply exploded after a few short bursts. Nonetheless, It was not all one-sided. At least 5 of the P-40s fell to gunners onboard the doomed Me 323s.
After the attack had begun, more Allied fighters arrived over Cap Bon. No 260 Squadron, including Flight-Lieutenant Edwards, arrived just in time to find one final ME 323 trying to escape towards the African coast. He turned his Kittyhawk towards the huge plane and shot it to pieces.
Soon the guns fell silent as the final Giant crashed into the waves below. Their escort was either outnumbered by the Spitfires and P-40s or, in the case of JG53 and JG77, too far away to lend a hand. When all was said and done, it was the perfect interception and even if the 109s had been able to intervene, the ME 323s would have been hard-pressed to make it to Tunis unscathed.
As the battle was winding down, even more allied fighters arrived, this time from 112 Squadron RAF, and tangled with the remaining 109s from JG 27. A handful were lost to the German fighters, but not enough to make up for the significant loss of the transport planes. Lt. Schneider claimed 2 Kittyhawks while Uffz. Stanglmaier destroyed a Spitfire for his first victory.
Picking up survivors
On the ground at Tunis, Oblt. Biedermann was finally able to spread the news of the air battle by telephone. As the news was given to the Geschwader Kommodore of KG 323, Oberstleutnant Gustav Damm he became irate. He demanded to know why the air-sea rescue service had not been alerted by radio while the Ju-52s were still airborne. It’s unclear if he received a satisfactory answer.
Disastrously, nearly three hours after the first shots had been fired, German rescue efforts began. Conditions were not ideal for sea rescue and the Fieseler Storks sent out to drop one-man life rafts, were not very successful. Heavy seas led to most of these life-saving vessels being dropped far away from the men in the water.
Other men were picked up by motor torpedo boats, which could get to the location quickly given the proximity to land. However, the waves and winds made finding the men difficult. The Storks circled overhead for hours to guide the boats to the men in the water. At long last, the last survivors were dragged into the boats at about 1800 hours. This meant that some of them had spent 8 1/2 hours in the water.
Although the Allies would overclaim that day, their butchery had indeed reaped results. Of the 14 ME 323s that had left Pomigliano that morning, not a single one arrived on terra firma on the North African coast. Joining them at the bottom of the Med were at least 700 drums of precious fuel. 7 German fighters were also reported lost.
The human cost was even more devastating. An initial and rather optimistic tally put the dead at just 2 with 113 men and officers missing in the sea. A further 18 were put down as injured to some degree. As the day continued the final and more sobering count came in. Of the 138 men that had left Italy in their gigantic steeds, only 19 were still breathing by sun down.
Aftermath and results of the ill-fated mission
However, the German attempt to resupply its army in Africa hadn’t been a complete failure. According to Me 323 pilot, Oblt. Ernst Peters, between late November 1942 and that fateful day, 22 April 1943, KGzbV 323 had transported 15,000 metric tons of equipment to Tunis and Bizerte in approximately 1,200 sorties. Among the items delivered were 309 trucks, 51 medium prime movers of up to 12 tonnes, 209 guns up to 150mm caliber, 324 light guns, 83 anti-tank and AA guns, 42 AA radar units, including ‘Wurzburg Riese’ and 96 armored troop carriers and self-propelled guns.
Safely in Tunis, the crews of the 10 Ju 52s must have been counting their lucky stars. The biggest difference, their commander had stuck to the plan and steered clear of Cap bon.
Ultimately, we could argue that the actions of Werner Stephan in changing course and leaving the rest of the air armada led to the massacre. But, seeing how determined the Allies were, we might also say his sacrifice saved the 10 JU 52s that escaped to Cap Farina. Had the formation stuck together, perhaps more German aircraft would have fallen.
Stephan was officially honored by Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring for his “heroic actions”. However, no one would ever find out why he chose to fly directly into the jaws of death, he would take his reasons to an early grave.
It has since been suggested that the course change was merely motivated by an urge to end a long and arduous journey, whatever the risks may have been. Had Stephan lived, he may have been asked to answer this charge in a court martial. As it was, his leadership led to one of the worst days of its kind in Luftwaffe history.
What’s astounding, is that the events of the 22nd April 1943 weren’t the worst suffered by the Germans as a result of Operation Flax. Just 4 days earlier, 34 Ju 52 and Axis fighters had fallen to American P 40s and British Spitfires in an almost identical mission, known as the Palm Sunday Massacre. But that’s a story for another video.
